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One of the most commonly cited studies on the eﬀect of child subsidies on fertility, Whittington,
Alm, and Peters (1990), claimed a large positive eﬀect of child tax beneﬁts on fertility using time
series methods. We revisit this question in light of recent increases in child tax beneﬁts by replicating
this earlier study and extending the analysis with an additional 20 years of data. We ﬁnd that
their results suﬀer from the spurious regression problem, and are not robust to diﬀerencing. We
ﬁnd evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant fertility response to a change in the real value of child tax
subsidies occurring with a one- to two-year lag, but a much smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant
total eﬀect after several years, suggesting that a change in the child tax subsidy most strongly
aﬀects the timing of births.
We would like to thank Brigitte Madrian for generously providing access to a letter from Leslie Whittington.
We would also like to thank participants in the Stanford Macro Bag Lunch, Peter Hansen, and Mohitosh
Kejriwal for helpful comments.1 Introduction
Standard economic theory tells us that the demand for children is inﬂuenced by the cost of
raising children. Holding other things constant, a decrease in the cost of raising children
should lead to an increase in the demand for children. In recent years, the value of child
tax beneﬁts has increased substantially relative to estimates of the cost of raising children.
As shown in Figure 1, the average value of the U.S. child tax subsidy adjusted for inﬂation
has increased from under $850 in 1980 to more than $2,000 in 2005.1 Using the U.S.D.A.
estimates of expenditures on children in the U.S., the $2,000 annual subsidy represents
between 13 and 49 percent of the average U.S. expenditure on children, depending on how
child expenditure is measured (Lino, 2006). Thus, the $1,150 real increase in child tax
beneﬁts can be thought of as a 7 to 28 percent discount in the cost of raising children. How
much of an eﬀect (if any) did this reduction in the cost of raising children have on fertility?
While a very important empirical question, the magnitude and timing of the fertility response
to child tax beneﬁts has received little attention.
Whittington, Alm, and Peters (1990) was the ﬁrst to seriously estimate the responsiveness
of fertility to child tax beneﬁt changes. Their analysis of time series data from 1913 to 1984
suggests that the U.S. fertility rate is very responsive to child tax beneﬁts. They estimate
that a $100 increase (in 2005 dollars) in the tax value of the personal exemption would
increase the general fertility rate by 2.1 to 4.2 births (a 3.2 to 6.5 percent increase).2
While the sign of the estimated eﬀect is not unexpected, the magnitude of the Whitting-
ton et al. (1990) estimate is surprising. If a $100 increase in annual child tax beneﬁts could
increase fertility by 6 percent, why are European countries, many with very generous and
salient child subsidy programs that are not hidden in the complexities of the income tax,
experiencing low and stagnant fertility rates? Or, to take the recent increase in U.S. child
1The details regarding the calculation of the average per-child tax subsidy are given in Section 4.
2Whittington, Alm, and Peters report their results in 1967 dollars. Their estimates of the eﬀect of the
value of the personal exemption in 1967 dollars on the general fertility rate range from 0.121 to 0.236.
Converting the dollar amounts to 2005 dollars using the CPI-U, we ﬁnd that their estimates range from
0.021 to 0.042.
1Figure 1: General Fertility Rate and Real Average Per Child Tax Subsidy
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tax beneﬁts, should we have expected a 32 to 65 percent increase in the U.S. fertility rate in
response to the $1,000 Child Tax Credit, holding all other factors constant?3
Since Whittington et al. (1990), there have only been a handful of empirical studies that
estimate a fertility response from changes in child tax beneﬁts or other child subsidies. The
closest study in terms of methodology is Zhang et al. (1994). This paper employs the same
speciﬁcation and time series techniques, but uses Canadian data from 1921 to 1988. They
ﬁnd that the responsiveness of Canadian fertility to child tax beneﬁts was about one half the
magnitude reported by Whittington et al.4 They interpret their results to be consistent with
the Whittington et al. ﬁndings and explain the smaller magnitude as likely due to diﬀerences
in the child beneﬁt programs between Canada and the United States.
3From 1997 (the year the Child Tax Credit was passed) to 2005, the general fertility rate in the United
States increased by 4.9 percent. Note however that eligibility restrictions and interactions in the tax code
make the $1,000 Child Tax Credit worth much less than this amount on average. From 1997 to 2005, the
average child subsidy increased by approximately $550 in real terms.
4Zhang and his coauthors use the total fertility rate instead of the general fertility rate as the measure of
fertility. Adjusting the coeﬃcient estimates to make them directly comparable to Whittington et al. (1990)
we ﬁnd that they range from 0.011 to 0.024.
2Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) ﬁnd evidence of similar magnitude to the results of Zhang
et al. (1994), but only in some countries of their 22 country panel. Cohen, Dehejia and
Romanov (2007) examine the role of ﬁnancial incentives on fertility in Israel and ﬁnd strong
eﬀects among low-income populations. Huang (2002), using time-series data from Taiwan,
also ﬁnds evidence of a smaller fertility response than was reported by Whittington et al.
(1990). Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003) examine the eﬀect of the expansion of the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the 1990s on ﬁrst-birth rates in the United States.
They ﬁnd no economically signiﬁcant fertility response among unmarried women and only
a small response for married women. By race, the largest estimated fertility response is for
married non-white women, but even this estimate is less the half the magnitude reported in
Whittington et al. Laroque and Salanie (2005) use individual data combined with detailed
tax and child program information to estimate a structural model of fertility. While child
subsides are quite generous in France, they ﬁnd evidence of only a small eﬀect on fertility.
Only Milligan (2005) reports estimates of the fertility response to child tax beneﬁts of
a similar magnitude as Whittington et al. (1990). Milligan ﬁnds a large eﬀect on fertility
from a 1988-1997 child subsidy program in Quebec. However, this large fertility eﬀect is in
part due to the temporary nature of the Quebec subsidy program; women may have had
children earlier in order to claim the subsidy with no change in their completed fertility.
Parent and Wang (2007) supports this hypothesis. Even so, Whittington et al. is cited by
an increasing number of publications (many in non-economics journals) as evidence of a
strong link between child tax beneﬁts and fertility. Perhaps this is because the Whittington
et al. paper came ﬁrst and was published in the American Economic Review, while most
of the other studies which indicate a smaller fertility response have been published in less
prominent journals.
In this paper, we revisit and extend the analysis in Whittington et al. (1990) for several
reasons. First, the availability of 21 additional years of data and the recent large increases
in child tax beneﬁts provide an opportunity to reassess the relationship between child tax
3beneﬁts and fertility. The addition of more recent data provides estimates of this relation-
ship that are perhaps more relevant in the current environment of large (and increasing)
child tax subsidies. It also allows us to examine child tax subsidies other than those used
by Whittington et al., who examined the response only to the real value of the personal ex-
emption. In our extended analysis, we include the child tax beneﬁts from the earned income
tax credit, the child and dependent care tax credit, and the child tax credit.
Second, more recent time series methods allow us to address shortcomings in the original
analysis and provide more nuanced interpretations of our results. We test for unit roots
in the data series, and examine both the presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship
between fertility and child tax subsidies and the short-run relationship between changes in
tax beneﬁts and changes in fertility. Lastly, more current published data sources for several
data series are now available.
We start by replicating the original Whittington et al. (1990) study. We are able to
reproduce Whittington et al.’s main ﬁndings, and we show that the results are likely due
to the spurious regression problem and are not robust to correcting for this problem by
diﬀerencing the data. We then extend the analysis using data through 2005 to examine what
the additional data and more recent econometric techniques show about the responsiveness of
fertility to the recent increases in the federal income tax subsidies for children. We ﬁnd that
changes in tax beneﬁts two years prior are positively associated with changes in fertility rates
in the current year. However, the overall eﬀect of tax beneﬁts on fertility is approximately
half the magnitude found in Whittington et al. and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The results suggest that the timing of births may be inﬂuenced by tax subsidies more than
the level of the general fertility rate. We do not ﬁnd evidence of a long-run equilibrium
relationship between child tax subsidies and the general fertility rate.
We employ a time-series approach and do not explore the other potential methods for
estimating the fertility response to changes in the child subsidy level. Instead, we focus
our eﬀorts on the time-series methods employed and on the data used, but acknowledge
4that the identiﬁcation of the fertility response to a change in the value of child tax beneﬁts
may be vulnerable to trends in unobserved variables. Milligan (2005) argues that time-
series variation is not suﬃcient to identify fertility eﬀects from child subsidy changes if
unobservable characteristics important for child-bearing decisions change through time and
are unobservable to the econometrician.
The time-series approach that we follow is vulnerable to this criticism. However, that
the fertility rate is aﬀected by unobservable factors is not enough to question the validity of
the time-series results. One must argue in addition that at least one of these unobservable
factors is correlated with an explanatory variable. For example, if U.S. households experience
a growing preference for a larger family size (a pure change in tastes) over the same period
in which there is an increase in the value of child tax beneﬁts, the increase in the fertility
rate due to the change in preferences may be incorrectly viewed as a response to the policy
change. Removing trends or diﬀerencing the series would not correct the basic spurious
correlation. With respect to the family size preference example, analysis of responses to
questions about intended or ideal family size in the General Social Survey performed by
Hagewen and Morgan (2005) reveals that there is “remarkable stability” in both the ideal
family size and fertility intentions since 1972 when the survey began. In contrast, the real
value of child tax beneﬁts is far from stable; it declines slightly from the 1970’s to the mid
1980’s and then increases dramatically over the 1990’s and into the current decade.
Section 2 describes our reconstruction of the dataset used in Whittington et al (1990).
Section 3 describes the estimation methods used to replicate Whittington et al. and provides
evidence for the spurious relationship between fertility and tax beneﬁts reported in their
earlier work. Section 4 describes reﬁnements to the 1913-1984 data and extending the data
through 2005. Section 5 reports the estimation results using the extended data and discusses
the timing of the fertility response, and Section 6 concludes. The complete datasets and
details of the data construction are given in the Appendix.
52 Data for Replication
Whittington et al. (1990) regressed the annual fertility rate from 1913 to 1984 on a set
of explanatory variables that they argued would aﬀect fertility: male and asset income,
unemployment, infant mortality, immigration, female wage, and binary variables for World
War II and the availability of the birth control pill. Some of the series that were not reported
in the appendix of the published paper have been lost since the paper’s publication. We have
tried to reconstruct the missing series using the footnotes and references in Whittington et
al. Here, we present only a brief summary of the data and how they were constructed.
Remaining details as well as the full data series are found in Appendix A.
The dependent variable is the general fertility rate, the number of births per thousand
women age 15-44. This measure is not as dependent on the age structure of the population
as the simple birthrate which measures the number of births divided by the total population.
However, the general fertility rate is aﬀected by changes in the age structure within the 15-44
group.
The primary variable of interest for Whittington et al. (1990) is the real tax value of the
personal exemption for dependents. Today, the personal exemption is only one of several
child subsidy provisions in the federal tax code accounting for about one-third to one-half
of the total child subsidy. However, for the 1913-1984 period considered in Whittington
et al., the personal exemption was the primary source of the implicit child subsidy, never
accounting for less than 85 percent of the total child subsidy. The statutory value of the
personal exemption for dependents changed only nine times between 1913 and 1984; however,
its real tax value ﬂuctuates substantially due to changes in marginal tax rates and the price
index.
The general fertility rate, value of the personal exemption, and the female wage series
which was constructed by Whittington et al. to measure the real change in average female
wages, were each reported in the paper’s appendix. The introduction of the birth control
pill and U.S. involvement in World War II are simple binary variables that equal one after
61963 for the birth control pill and between 1941-1945 for World War II. The male and asset
income series is a measure of average family income less female earnings. While this series
was not reported in the appendix of Whittington et al. (1990), it was recorded in a letter
from Leslie Whittington.5
We were unable to obtain the original data for unemployment, infant mortality, and
immigration which required reconstruction of these series by following the description in
Whittington et al. (1990). The unemployment series is from Lebergott (1964) and the U.S.
Census Bureau (2003).6 The infant mortality series is from the U.S. Census Bureau (2003)
and measures the number of children who die before reaching their ﬁrst birthday (excluding
fetal deaths), per thousand children born.7 The immigration series measures the number of
immigrants age 16-44 as a fraction of the resident population in the same age group. These
data were obtained from various versions of the Historical Statistics of the United States as
described in Appendix A.
It is clear from Table 1 that there are small diﬀerences between the reconstructed series
and those used in Whittington et al. (1990). Diﬀerences in the data seem to be present even
for some series that we copied directly from the Whittington et al. appendix. In fact, of those
series for which we obtained original data (general fertility rate, personal exemption, male
and asset income, and female wage), only the personal exemption series exactly matches the
reported moments. The general fertility rate and female wage series reported in the appendix
are either diﬀerent than the series used to report the summary statistics or some error was
made in computing the mean and standard deviation.8 The male and asset income series
5Brigitte Madrian generously gave us access to a 1991 letter she received from Leslie Whittington in
which the full male and asset income series used in Whittington et al. (1990) is reported.
6The U.S. Census Bureau unemployment data are from the Statistical Abstract of the United States:
2003, Mini-Historical Series HS-29 which covers the 1929-1984 period. The Lebergott data are from table
A-3 and only the 1913-1928 data is used.
7The infant mortality data are from the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003, Mini-Historical
Series HS-13.
8According to the letter received by Brigitte Madrian, the average female wage index values for 1972 and
1919 were typos. However, correcting these typos leads to greater discrepancies between both the reported
moments and the replication results, so we use the series as reported in Whittington et al. in the replication
analysis.
7reported in previous correspondence from Leslie Whittington has the same problem. The
unemployment, infant mortality, and immigration series that we constructed quite accurately
match the reported moments.
Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1913–1984
Replicated Data Whittington et al.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
General Fertility Rate 72 95.6 19.81 95.5 19.64
Personal Exemption 72 100.4 65.88 100.4 65.88
Male and Asset Income 72 7,467.38 2,926.06 7,466.37 2,982.78
Unemployment 72 0.071 0.054 0.071 0.053
Infant Mortality 72 43.02 26.84 43.02 26.84
Immigration 72 0.003 0.0036 0.003 0.0035
Female Wage 72 1.35 0.585 1.22 0.532
Pill 72 0.306 0.464 0.305 0.464
WW II 72 0.069 0.256 0.069 0.256
Time Trend 72 36.5 20.93 36.5 20.92
Variables expressed in constant 1967 dollars.
3 Replication and New Methods
Following Whittington et al. (1990) we estimate the following reduced form equation for the
period 1913 to 1984:
Fertility Ratet = β0 + β1 Personal Exemptiont + β2 Male and Asset Incomet
+ β3 Unemploymentt + β4 Infant Mortalityt + β5 Immigrationt
+ β6 Female Waget + β7 Pillt + β8 WW2t + β9 Time Trendt + ǫt.
(1)
Whittington et al. (1990) give a general description of their estimation method: “Gener-
alized least squares estimation is performed with a Yule-Walker ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
correction scheme,” motivated by a stated concern about serial correlation. A Durbin-Watson
test using the OLS residuals of our replicated data conﬁrms the presence of serial correlation.
The OLS residuals from a regression of Equation (1) are plotted in Figure 2. The residuals
8exhibit a clear cyclical pattern rather than white noise, indicating that the errors are indeed
serially correlated.
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We believe the somewhat vague terminology for the estimation procedure in Whittington
et al. (1990) refers to FGLS estimation of an AR(1) model, such as a Cochrane-Orcutt or
Prais-Winsten estimation procedure. Although not stated, some experimentation leads us
to the conclusion that Whittington et al. uses a two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, the
OLS residuals are obtained in order to estimate ρ, where ut = ρut−1+ǫt. The now-estimated
ˆ ρ is used to quasi-diﬀerence all variables:
˜ xt = xt − ˆ ρxt−1. (2)
The second step is to run an OLS regression using the quasi-diﬀerenced variables. This
procedure gives the ﬁnal results for the Cochrane-Orcutt estimation method. The Prais-
Winsten method is similar, but uses, in addition, the ﬁrst observation transformed by the
factor
p
(1 − ˆ ρ2) in the OLS regression.
Although we believe that Whittington et al. (1990) uses a two-step estimation procedure
9similar to Cochrane-Orcutt or Prais-Winsten, the details of the procedure are not precisely
speciﬁed. In addition, since we have slightly diﬀerent data, it is unlikely that we would
exactly replicate the Whittington et al. results. We report the original estimates of the
primary speciﬁcation as reported in Whittington et al. as Model (1) in Table 2. Next,
we report the regular OLS estimates using the replicated data with Newey-West standard
errors (robust to serial correlation) as Model (2) in Table 2. Finally, we report the results
from two-step Prais-Winsten estimation using the replicated data with ˆ ρ based on adjusted
autocorrelation as Model (3) in Table 2.
Model (3) closely replicates the original Model (1) results. The estimated coeﬃcient on
the tax value of the personal exemption is very close to the reported value in Whittington et
al. (1990). In addition, the remaining coeﬃcient estimates are also similar to Whittington
et al.’s results. Slight diﬀerences in the data (including the series that were obtained from
the paper itself) likely explain deviations from the original results.9
At ﬁrst glance, Model (3) does not seem to ﬁt the data as well as Model (1), as measured
by the R
2. However, we believe the R
2 reported in Whittington et al. (1990) is inﬂated. Be-
cause the estimation method was not a pre-programmed procedure at the time Whittington
et al. was written, it was likely performed manually. The manual implementation involves
transforming each variable, and the regression performed in the second stage does not have
a true constant term; therefore, the deﬁnition of the R
2 is ambiguous. Using the total sum of
squares from the original OLS regression run in the ﬁrst step of the Prais-Winston procedure
(i.e. the non-transformed general fertility rate) and the sum of squared residuals from Model
(3) yields an R
2 of 0.919. While this technique does not give an accurate description of the
ﬁt of Model (3), it represents a plausible method that Whittington et al. may have used to
arrive at their reported R
2 of 0.916.
9Currently, there are several diﬀerent methods possible to estimate ρ in the ﬁrst step of the estimation
procedure. Among the possible methods, estimating ρ by OLS gives the strongest ﬁt to Whittington et al.’s
results, and yields an estimate of ˆ ρ = 0.5963625. This value of ˆ ρ was used to quasi-diﬀerence the variables,
and transform the ﬁrst observation. Estimating Equation 1 with ˆ ρ = 0.581 yields an estimate of the key
coeﬃcient, β1, as 0.121, the same as the reported estimate in Whittington et al. However, using this value
for ˆ ρ does not eliminate the deviations in the other estimated coeﬃcients.
10Table 2: Comparison of Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Whittington et al. OLS Prais-Winsten
Personal Exemption 0.121 0.178 0.116
(0.0446)** (0.0977) (0.0449)**
Male and Asset Income -0.0004 0.0035 0.0007
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0025)
Unemployment -73.43 -68.12 -68.19
(34.20)** (25.818)* (34.004)**
Infant Mortality 0.083 0.393 0.0351
(0.255) (0.321) (0.251)
Immigration 774.24 964.13 760.71
(311.31)** (329.44)** (304.98)**
Female Wage 5.647 15.427 5.629
(15.686) (5.286)** (5.036)
Pill -10.856 -25.383 -12.014
(6.126)* (11.961)* (6.028)*
WW II -17.223 -29.419 -17.863
(4.989)** (8.057)** (4.854)**
Time Trend -0.539 -0.843 -0.741
(0.538) (0.543) (0.510)
Intercept 102.979 55.944 104.130
(24.666)** (25.831)* (23.368)**
R
2 0.916 0.829 0.749
Standard errors in parentheses.
Model (2) reports Newey-West standard errors.
Variables expressed in constant 1967 dollars.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level
** signiﬁcant at the 5% level
11Zhang et al. (1994) mention that there is a concern that some series in both their study
and the Whittington et al. (1990) study may be non-stationary. Therefore, both the Zhang et
al. and the Whittington et al. results could suﬀer from what is called the spurious regression
problem if some of the series are integrated of order one, or I(1). This is a well known criticism
of Whittington et al. ﬁndings.10 However, Zhang et al. dismiss these criticisms claiming that
because the “time trend is insigniﬁcant” in their estimation, there is no concern that the
results are being driven by a regression of “time against time.” They argue further that
when the time trend is dropped, “the result on the tax-transfer variables holds and [the] R
squared is virtually unchanged.”
However, an insigniﬁcant time trend coeﬃcient estimate does not alleviate concerns that
some of the series are I(1). Granger and Newbold (1974) in their seminal paper on spurious
regressions argue that annual macro series, like those used in this study, are almost always
I(1); thus, regressions involving the levels will be misleading, suggesting relationships when
there may be none. Careful inspection of the data reveals that many of the Whittington et
al. (1990) series do exhibit unit root behavior and should therefore be treated as I(1).11 An
initial approach to determine which series are I(1) is to regress each variable on its lagged
value, and estimate the AR(1) model:
xt = α + ρxt−1 + ǫt (3)
A series has a unit root if the true population parameter ρ equals one. We ﬁrst determine
if each series has a clear time trend, α. From inspection of the series in Figure 3, it appears
that Male and Asset Income, Infant Mortality, and Female Wage have a time trend. If the
series did not have a clear time trend, the constant was omitted from the AR(1) regression.
10Wooldridge (2006), a popular undergraduate econometrics text, uses the Whittington et al. data as an
example of the spurious regression problem.
11In the analysis that follows, we correct the female wage series reported in Whittington et al. for typos
documented in the letter from Leslie Whittington to Brigitte Madrian discussed in footnote 8. The corrected
values are 0.548 in 1919 and 2.094 in 1972. The remaining data series are as reported in the Appendix. Results
in the remainder of this section are robust to using the series as reported in Whittington et al.
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(f) Female Wage
13The estimated values of ρ are reported in Table 3. To test if an estimated value of ρ is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than one, we use the augmented Dicky-Fuller test.12
Table 3: Testing for a Unit Root, 1913–1984
Variable Trend? ρ α DF Approx. p-value Unit Root?
General Fertility Rate Yes 0.978 1.3049 0.9150 Yes
(0.026) (2.549)
Personal Exemption 0.993 0.3717 Yes
(0.018)
Male & Asset Income Yes 0.996 133.945 0.3762 Yes
(0.015) (117.305)
Unemployment 0.961 0.1162 Yes
(0.034)
Infant Mortality Yes 0.972 -0.024 0.7250 Yes
(0.013) (0.649)
Immigration 0.740 0.0069 No
(0.051)
Female Wage Yes 0.995 0.032 0.0698 Yes
(0.011) (0.017)
Standard errors in parentheses
Dickey-Fuller test run with 2 lags
For each of these series, a value of ρ close to one is evidence that the series may be I(1).
Using Dickey-Fuller tests, we are able to reject the null hypotheses that a series is I(1) for the
immigration series only. Each of the other series show strong evidence of unit root behavior,
as they have an estimated value of ρ close to one and the Dickey-Fuller test does not provide
evidence to the contrary.13
Time series regressions with variables that are I(1) can give very misleading results, and
our tests indeed indicate that estimation using the levels of our reconstructed data would
suﬀer from the spurious regression problem. An approach to addressing this problem is to
12When ρ is close to 1, the sampling distributions of the estimator of ˆ ρ is extremely diﬀerent. The
augmented Dicky-Fuller test is similar to the AR(1) regression, but subtracts yt−1 from both sides. To
perform the test, we estimate ∆yt = θyt−1 + ǫt. Now θ = ρ − 1, so we test the null hypothesis that θ = 0
(i.e. the variable contains a unit root) against the alternative that θ < 1. For variables with a time trend,
the test is adjusted appropriately.
13We report the results of the Dickey-Fuller test assuming two lags. The results are generally robust to
including other reasonable numbers of lags.
14ﬁrst-diﬀerence the variables that have a unit root. Each ﬁrst-diﬀerenced series is weakly
dependent, and thus usual OLS inference procedures are valid.14 We run the speciﬁcations
described in Whittington et al. using the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the appropriate series. The
results are reported in Table 4.
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation reported in Table 4 is comparable to those in Table 2 and includes
no lagged values. Whittington et al. (1990) also run speciﬁcations with various lag structures
to capture a potential delay in fertility response. They ﬁnd that both the magnitude and
the statistical signiﬁcance of their results are robust to these lag structures. In our second
and third speciﬁcations, we specify particular lag structures as in Whittington et al. The
second speciﬁcation has a three-year rectangular lag on the personal exemption, with equal
weights on each of the three lags as shown below in equation (4). The coeﬃcient on the
rectangular lag can be interpreted as a measure of the total eﬀect of the personal exemption
on the general fertility rate.
Rectangular Lag Structure =
1
3
(∆PEt + ∆PEt−1 + ∆PEt−2) (4)
The third speciﬁcation gives personal exemption an inverted V-shaped pattern, with weights
increasing until the second lag, and then decreasing. The rationale for this particular lag
structure, as stated in Whittington et al., comes from the biological average of “24 to 31
months required to produce a birth.”
















The results in Table 4 show that had Whittington et al. (1990) corrected for the spurious
regression problem by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing, they would not have found a strong positive rela-
tionship between child tax beneﬁts and fertility in their speciﬁcations. The results are not
14The Dickey-Fuller test was run on the diﬀerenced series, and the null hypothesis of the presence of a
unit root can be rejected in the diﬀerenced series.
15Table 4: Impact of Personal Exemption on Fertility in the United States, 1913–1984
Variable (1) (2) (3)
∆ Personal Exemption -0.084
(0.042)*
∆ Personal Exemption -0.015
(Rectangular Lag Structure) (0.082)
∆ Personal Exemption 0.116
(V-Shaped Lag Structure) (0.152)
∆ Male and Asset Income -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)
∆ Unemployment -20.985 -23.184 -17.552
(31.280) (33.534) (34.946)
∆ Infant Mortality -0.042 -0.033 -0.038
(0.315) (0.351) (0.380)
Immigration 68.878 -92.7 -48
(119.073) (325.409) (295.193)
∆ Female Wage 7.472 8.368 4.802
(5.792) (4.896)* (6.864)
Pill -1.91 -1.71 -1.357
(1.020)* (0.995)* (1.038)
WW II 5.138 2.324 -1.231
(3.377) (4.692) (6.245)
Intercept -0.618 -0.042 -0.229
(0.954) (1.330) (1.085)
R-squared 0.2035 0.1258 0.1553
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Variables expressed in constant 1967 dollars.
Model (1): no lags on independent variables.
Model (2): rectangular lag on the personal exemption only.
Model (3): ﬁve-year inverted V on personal exemption only.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level
** signiﬁcant at the 5% level
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level
16robust to the speciﬁcation of the lag structure. None of the estimated coeﬃcients on personal
exemption are signiﬁcant, and the signs of the point estimates in three of the speciﬁcations
are negative rather than positive. These results suggest that the Whittington et al. results
were due to the large degree of persistence in the data, and therefore should not be cited as
evidence of a fertility response to child tax beneﬁts.
4 Extending the Data
As explained in Section 3, there are several problems with the data used in Whittington et
al. (1990). Rather than simply adding data for the additional 21 years (1985-2005) to the
reconstructed 1913-1984 series, we examine each series to determine if better sources are
available. The data construction is outlined in this section with additional details provided
in Appendix B.
We found discrepancies between the general fertility rate series reported in Whittington
et al. (1990) and general fertility rates available from more current published sources. We
use fertility data from the National Vital Statistics Report (Martin et al. 2005 ) for those
years in which it is available. For earlier years, we use the estimates from the Datapedia of
the United States (Kurian 2001).
We follow the Whittington et al. (1990) methodology in calculating the value of the
personal exemption, multiplying the statutory level of the dependent exemption by the
average statutory marginal tax rate.15 In the subsequent analysis, we use a measure of the
total value of child tax beneﬁts in the federal income tax, as recent tax changes have increased
the importance of other child tax beneﬁts in comparison to the personal exemption.16 In
addition to the tax value of the personal exemption, the total child subsidy series also includes
the tax value of the child tax credit, the child and dependent care tax credit, and the earned
income tax credit (EITC). The average tax value of these credits is calculated by dividing
15This measure was introduced by Barrow and Sahasakul (1983). The complete methodology is explained
in the appendix.
16The results are not sensitive to the deﬁnition of child tax beneﬁts that is used.
17Table 5: Summary Statistics, 1913–2005
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
General Fertility Rate 93 88.9 21.4 63.6 126.6
Child Tax Subsidy 93 760.9 492.7 0 2088.0
Male & Asset Income 93 31,287 11,681 17,043 50,169
Unemployment 93 0.0679 0.0476 0.0120 0.2490
Infant Mortality 93 35.15 27.77 6.7 101
Immigration 93 0.00351 0.00257 0.00028 0.01505
Female Wage 93 7.59 3.34 2.14 12.93
Pill 93 0.462 0.501 0 1
WW II 93 0.054 0.227 0 1
Variables expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
the total federal tax expenditure on these credits by the number of children in the United
States.
We construct a revised male and asset income data series, using more recently available
data. The male and asset income series is constructed from some of the same source material
as Whittington et al. (1990), but also incorporates male income data reported by the U.S.
Census Bureau (see the appendix). Similarly, we utilize more recent data for female wages
and Whittington et al.’s historical series to create an extended female wage series.
The series for unemployment, infant mortality, and immigration come from the same
source material as the series used for replication, and are simply extended to 2005. The
summary statistics for the extended data are reported in Table 5. We check each series
for unit root behavior using the same procedures as explained in Section 3. Each series is
inspected to determine if it has a time trend, as shown in Figure 4. The regression of each
variable on its lagged value and the p-value from the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit
root are reported in Table 6.
The outcomes of the unit root tests are similar to those performed on the replicated series
in Section 3. While the Dickey-Fuller test provides some evidence to support the hypothesis
that unemployment does not have a unit root, we report results in Section 5 assuming this
series does have a unit root due to the estimated ρ close to 1 and in order to maintain
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19Table 6: Testing for a Unit Root, 1913–2005
DF Approx.
Variable Trend? ρ α p-value Unit Root?
General Fertility Rate Yes 0.975 1.633 0.8414 Yes
(0.019) (1.701)
Child Tax Subsidy Yes 1.002 0.8713 Yes
(0.024)
Male & Asset Income Yes 1.000 310.31 0.3984 Yes
(0.010) (316.69)
Unemployment 0.964 0.0501 Yes
(0.029)
Infant Mortality Yes 0.971 0.010 0.5387 Yes
(0.009) (0.424)
Immigration 0.871 0.0597 No
(0.040)
Female Wage Yes 0.997 0.141 0.1297 Yes
(0.007) (0.059)
Standard errors in parentheses
comparison with the prior analysis. However, we have performed the analysis under the
alternative assumption and found that the results are robust.
5 Updated Results
In this section, we revisit the question of whether time series analysis shows an eﬀect of
child tax beneﬁts on fertility using the data series from 1913-2005 described above. We
ﬁrst show that the main result from Table 4, namely that the strong results reported in
Whittington et al. (1990) are not robust to ﬁrst-diﬀerencing, follows through when we change
the inﬂation base year, use more currently available data sources, change the time period
analyzed, and examine additional features of the tax code that provide tax subsidies to
families with children. Table 7 summarizes our ﬁndings. In Column (1), we report our
replication of Whittington et al.’s main speciﬁcation, copied from Column (3) in Table 2.
These results are reported in constant 1967 dollars and are calculated using data series from
20the years 1913-1984. For Columns (2) and later, we make two changes: the value of the
child tax subsidy, male income, and female wage are converted to constant 2005 dollars; and
the typos in Whittington et al.’s series (discussed in footnote 8) are corrected. The eﬀect
of changing the base year can be seen clearly in the coeﬃcient on the tax subsidy: whereas
our replication of Whittington et al. in Column (1) showed that $100 in tax beneﬁts (in
1967 dollars) are associated with an increase in the general fertility rate of 11.6, the results
in Column (2) show that the comparable change in the general fertility rate for $100 in
tax beneﬁts (in 2007 dollars) is 1.7 births. This value provides a benchmark against which
results from our subsequent analyses can be measured.
Moving from Column (2) to Column (3) illustrates the eﬀect of ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the
series that contain a unit root. As was true in Table 4, the coeﬃcient on the tax subsidy
ﬂips sign and decreases in magnitude. Columns (4) and (5) are similar to Columns (2) and
(3), but summarize the analysis using our extended data series for 1913-2005. The results in
Columns (4) and (5) show that using updated data sources and extending the data through
2005 do not substantively change the key coeﬃcients estimated in Columns (2) and (3).
Finally, Columns (6) and (7) repeat the analysis including other child tax beneﬁts in the tax
subsidy series. While the coeﬃcients on the total child tax subsidy variable are of the same
signs as in Columns (4) and (5), they are no longer signiﬁcant and smaller in magnitude.
Because of the increasing importance of tax subsidies for children other than the personal
exemption (see Figure 1) and their more salient nature, the changes in the key coeﬃcients
that result from adding in these other tax beneﬁts cast additional doubt regarding the true
eﬀect of tax subsidies on fertility. Overall, Table 7 shows that Whittington et al.’s result
is sensitive to correcting for unit roots by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing and adding the tax subsidies for
children in other parts of the tax code, but not to changing the time period studied or using
more currently available data sources.
For all following analysis, we use our extended data series for the 1913-2005 sample period,
and use the total child tax subsidy (personal exemption + child tax beneﬁts from the earned
21Table 7: Comparison of Estimation Results
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Personal Exemption 0.116 0.017 -0.014 0.011 -0.013
(0.045)** (0.008)** (0.007)* (0.006)* (0.007)*
Total Child Tax Subsidy 0.005 -0.007
(0.004) (0.006)
Male and Asset Income 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)
Unemployment -68.191 -68.019 -20.985 -86.711 -10.041 -84.979 -8.957
(34.004)** (33.684)** (31.280) (25.079)*** (26.985) (24.274)*** (27.301)
Infant Mortality 0.035 -0.013 -0.042 0.057 -0.072 -0.088 -0.054
(0.251) (0.247) (0.315) (0.157) (0.281) (0.139) (0.274)
Immigration 760.712 698.917 68.878 1,079.458 198.098 977.633 194.315
(304.983)** (299.761)** (119.073) (297.470)*** (135.746) (289.513)*** (138.742)
Female Wage 5.629 2.829 1.278 4.137 2.127 4.303 1.924
(5.036) (2.416) (0.990) (2.349)* (1.270)* (2.240)* (1.196)
Pill -12.014 -10.937 -1.910 -6.080 -0.688 -5.427 -0.440
(6.028)* (5.902)* (1.020)* (4.697) (0.866) (4.643) (0.841)
WW II -17.863 -16.269 5.138 -13.736 4.703 -11.376 3.468
(4.854)*** (4.772)*** (3.377) (3.865)*** (2.758)* (3.682)*** (2.572)
Time Trend -0.741 -0.969 -0.527 -0.725
(0.510) (0.590) (0.348) (0.368)*
Constant 104.130 108.208 -0.618 119.724 -1.272 133.054 -1.174
(23.368)*** (23.052)*** (0.954) (15.527)*** (0.898) (13.493)*** (0.943)
Levels or Diﬀerences? Levels Levels Diﬀerences Levels Diﬀerences Levels Diﬀerences
Observations 72 72 71 93 92 93 92
R-squared 0.749 0.745 0.203 0.804 0.145 0.792 0.103
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Model (1): Replication of Whittington et al. (1990) as shown in Column (3), Table 2.
Model (2): Variables expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
Model (3): Variables expressed in constant 2005 dollars, with estimation performed in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
Model (4): Extended data series for sample period 1913-2005.
Model (5): Extended data series for sample period 1913-2005, with estimation performed in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
Model (6): Model (4) with additional child tax beneﬁts included.
Model (7): Model (5) with additional child tax beneﬁts included.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level
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2income tax credit, the child and dependent care tax credit, and the child tax credit) as our
measure of tax beneﬁts that may aﬀect fertility, except when otherwise indicated. We believe
the revised data sources represent the most accurate available time series, and that ignoring
the features of the tax code that subsidize children would misrepresent the responsiveness of
fertility to tax beneﬁts. We also perform the remaining analysis including ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
series for variables that were found to contain a unit root in Table 6.
As pointed out in Whittington et al. (1990), there are several reasons to believe that
fertility response from changes in covariates may occur with a lag. The birth of a child will
lag the decision to have a child by at least nine months and frequently longer, and therefore
the relevant variable in analyzing fertility in year t may be the covariate’s value in year t−1.
Covariates in time t may have little inﬂuence on fertility in year t.17
There is a compelling reason to believe that the fertility response from changes in child tax
beneﬁts may be even more delayed. While a fertility response would not likely be observed
until at least one year after a change to child tax beneﬁts, it takes some time for taxpayers to
learn that a tax change has taken place. Changes to the tax code are often made while the
tax year is well underway. Individuals are not likely to learn about tax changes until they
do their taxes (in April of the following year). While this may have an immediate eﬀect on
the decision to have a child, the actual birth is then realized with a delay. Therefore, while
a single lag may be appropriate for the other regressors, the real value of child tax beneﬁts
should enter the fertility equation with at least two lags. That is, we posit that a tax policy
change in year t may not aﬀect the decision to have children until year t+1 and thus would
not aﬀect the total fertility rate until year t + 2.
Table 8 reports the results from a regression of the diﬀerenced total fertility rate on
the current and ﬁrst four lags of the diﬀerenced real value of child tax beneﬁts. The other
controls (male and asset income, unemployment rate, infant mortality rate, immigration
rate, female wage index, and indicators for the pill and World War II) are included in the
17Immigration by women of childbearing age is an exception since some women may be pregnant at the
time of immigration.
23Table 8: Child Tax Beneﬁts Lagged Eﬀect on Fertility
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidy -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−1 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−2 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.012
(0.006)** (0.007)* (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)**
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−3 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−4 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Measure of Total Eﬀect 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Current Covariates Included Yes Yes No No No
Lagged Covariates Included No Yes Yes No Yes
Error Correction Model No No No No Yes
Observations 88 88 88 88 88
R-squared 0.252 0.358 0.288 0.214 0.320
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level
** signiﬁcant at the 5% level
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level
Note: only current values of Pill and WW2 included in Column (2)
estimations as indicated in the table although the estimated coeﬃcients are not reported.
Current values of the covariates are included in Columns (1) and (2), and lagged values are
included in Columns (2) and (3). No other control variables are included in Column (4).
The results in Table 8 suggest that the estimated eﬀect of the second lag of child tax ben-
eﬁts on fertility is smaller than the Whittington et al. (1990) estimate but still signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero across most of the speciﬁcations. This estimate ranges from 0.012 to
0.014 implying an increase of about 1.2 to 1.4 births per 1,000 women age 15-44 is associated
with a $100 increase in the real value of child tax beneﬁts in 2005 dollars. The second lag
is the only lagged value that is signiﬁcant across most speciﬁcations and provides evidence
24supporting our hypothesis that a tax policy change aﬀects the fertility rate with a two-year
lag.
The true total eﬀect of tax beneﬁts on the general fertility rate is not only the eﬀect after
two years, but rather the sum of the coeﬃcients of all lagged values. Table 8 also reports the
measure of this total eﬀect with standard errors. The values across the four speciﬁcations are
small and statistically insigniﬁcant, ranging from 0.006 to 0.013.18 Excluding the estimate
obtained in the speciﬁcation reported in Column (4) which contains no additional controls,
the estimates suggest that a $100 increase in the real value of child tax beneﬁts in 2005
dollars is associated with an increase of approximately 0.6 to 0.8 births. The magnitude of
this total eﬀect is approximately half the magnitude of the Whittington et al. estimate of
1.7 births as calculated in Table 7, Column (2), and is statistically insigniﬁcant across all
speciﬁcations. These results suggest that tax beneﬁts may aﬀect the timing of births and
we ﬁnd only weak evidence for an overall response of fertility to tax beneﬁts. Our estimates
of the total eﬀect are consistently small and positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant.
Expressing the regression in levels allows us to evaluate the long-run equilibrium rela-
tionship between subsidies and the general fertility rate, while results of the ﬁrst-diﬀerence
models test the hypothesis that there is a short-term relationship between the subsidy and
fertility. The results in Column (6) of Table 7 did not provide evidence of a long-run rela-
tionship between subsidies and the general fertility rate. In addition, in results not reported,
we have estimated several diﬀerent speciﬁcations of Column (6) using lagged values of both
the subsidy level and covariates. In all of the speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients on the subsidy
variable and its lagged counterparts are not statistically signiﬁcant.
However, the results in Table 8 suggest that there is a short-term relationship between
the tax subsidy and general fertility rates and that this short-term relationship occurs with
18To calculate the total eﬀect of a change in tax beneﬁts on fertility and its standard error, the method
outlined in Wooldridge (2006) is used as follows. Suppose the estimated coeﬃcient on lag t of the diﬀerenced
child tax subsidy is δt. We deﬁne θ as the total eﬀect, where θ = δ0 + δ1 + δ2 + δ3 + δ4. We then regress
∆GFRt on ∆Subsidyt, ∆Subsidyt−1 − ∆Subsidyt, ∆Subsidyt−2 − ∆Subsidyt, ∆Subsidyt−3 − ∆Subsidyt,
∆Subsidyt−4 − ∆Subsidyt and the other covariates. The coeﬃcient and standard error on ∆Subsidyt is a
measure of the total eﬀect of tax beneﬁts on fertility.
25a lag. As a further robustness check on this hypothesis, we estimate an error correction
model in which the lagged residuals from the regression in levels are included in the ﬁrst
diﬀerence model as the error correction term. This model estimates a short-run relationship
while controlling for the long-run relationship between the variables. Given that we do not
ﬁnd evidence for a long-run relationship, it is unlikely that adding a control for the long-
run relationship will change the estimated short-term relationship. However, we present the
results of the error correction model in Column (5) of Table 8. The results provide additional
support to the hypothesis that tax subsidies have a short-run inﬂuence on fertility that occurs
with a lag.
There were large tax rate changes during World War II, signiﬁcantly increasing the value
of the personal exemption, and this period was followed by large increases in fertility that
constituted the baby boom. We therefore examine the period 1960-2005 separately to deter-
mine whether the results in Table 8 are being driven by these two events. Performing the
estimation on the 1960-2005 data decreases the sample size considerably, but allows us to
estimate the modern level of responsiveness and eliminates the large fertility changes during
the depression and World War II.
Table 9 reports the results from these regressions. The columns correspond to the columns
in Table 8, the only diﬀerence being the time period examined. The results are similar with
one important diﬀerence: eﬀects of tax beneﬁts on fertility are present after one lag rather
than two. Table 9 suggests that the estimated eﬀect of the ﬁrst lag of child tax beneﬁts on
fertility is approximately 0.7 to 1 birth per $100 in child tax beneﬁts, though the estimate is
not as statistically strong, likely due to the decrease in the number of observations. The shift
of the response to one year following a change in tax subsidies rather than two years may be
explained by a decrease in the amount of time needed to realize that child tax beneﬁts have
increased. Increases in the child tax credit were heavily advertised including early payment
of the credit to eligible families in one year. The estimated total eﬀects are similarly positive,
generally statistically insigniﬁcant, though larger in magnitude relative to the total eﬀects
26Table 9: Child Tax Beneﬁts Lagged Eﬀect on Fertility: 1960-2005
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidy 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−1 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.007
(0.005)** (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)** (0.006)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−2 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)* (0.005)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−3 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ Total Child Tax Subsidyt−4 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Measure of Total Eﬀect 0.013 0.009 0.015 0.025 0.016
(0.015) (0.018) (0.014) (0.009)*** (0.014)
Current Covariates Included Yes Yes No No No
Lagged Covariates Included No Yes Yes No Yes
Error Correction Model No No No No Yes
Observations 46 46 46 46 46
R-squared 0.323 0.394 0.302 0.223 0.330
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level
** signiﬁcant at the 5% level
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level
Note: only current values of Pill and WW2 included in Column (2)
shown in Table 8.
Overall, we ﬁnd some suggestive evidence that tax subsidies for children have a modest
short-term eﬀect on fertility rates with a two-year lag. In more recent time periods, the eﬀect
is present one year after a change in tax subsidies. The overall eﬀect is approximately half
the magnitude found by Whittington et al. (1990) who reported an increase in the general
fertility rate of roughly 2 births after an increase in child tax subsidies of $100 in 2005 dollars.
However, the total eﬀect of tax beneﬁts on fertility is not statistically signiﬁcant, and could
be evidence in favor of the hypothesis that tax beneﬁts aﬀect the timing but not the overall
level of fertility. Our revised results adjust for the persistence in the time series data that
27was driving the results reported in Whittington et al., include the total value of all child
tax beneﬁts rather than only the personal exemption for dependents (which has decreased
in relative importance in recent years), and extend the analysis to include the most recent
20 years which saw large increases in subsidies for families with children.
6 Conclusion
The eﬀect of tax policy on fertility rates is often neglected in the literature on federal tax
policy, even though child tax beneﬁts are large and have recently grown in importance. One
of the most cited studies on this topic, Whittington et al. (1990), uses basic time-series
methods and estimates a very large fertility rate response to the tax value of the dependent
exemption. We attempt to replicate the Whittington et al. result, and show that the analysis
suﬀers from the spurious regression problem and that the result is not robust to diﬀerencing.
We update the time-series data 21 years to 2005, and employ more recent time-series
methods to revisit whether fertility responds to changes in the child tax beneﬁts in the
federal income tax. The results show that the general fertility rate is most responsive to the
second lag of the value of child tax beneﬁts. This is consistent with a view that families do
not learn about changes in the tax beneﬁts associated with having children until they do
their taxes. However, estimation using data from only the post-war period show that fertility
may begin to respond after only one year. The overall estimates of the fertility response to
child tax beneﬁts using the updated data and methods are about half the magnitude of those
found in Whittington et al. (1990) and statistically insigniﬁcant.
We urge caution in any application of these results. While this study provides an updated
look at methods employed by Whittington et al. (1990) and a more moderate estimate of the
responsiveness of fertility to child tax beneﬁts, there is concern that the identiﬁcation strategy
employed by using time-series analysis is ﬂawed because of correlation between unobserved
variables that inﬂuence fertility rates and the tax policy. Further work using an alternative
28identiﬁcation strategy, such as using detailed micro data of fertility by income, would provide
additional evidence regarding the magnitude of the estimated fertility response.
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31Appendix: Data for Replication and Extensions
A Data for Replication
The general fertility rate, the real value of the personal exemption, and the female wage were
obtained directly from Whittington et al. (1990).
Male and Asset Income
The male and asset income series was obtained from a letter in which Leslie Whittington lists this
series. Whittington et al. derived these data for 1913-1948 from Historical Statistics Series D722-727
and D830-844 by calculating a male-to-average earnings ratio, and multiplying this by the average
earnings. Years 1949-1955 were derived in the same manner, but used data from the CPS Series
P-60 on median earnings. Years 1956-1984 are directly from CPS Series P-60. Nonwage income
was obtained from the 1988 Economic Report of the President by subtracting Compensation from
National Income, dividing by the population, and multiplying by average family size. The series
is adjusted for inﬂation and is included as a measure of the income eﬀect on fertility. The year to
which the series is normalized is not reported.
Unemployment
Whittington et al. (1990) do not report their source for the annual national unemployment series.
Unemployment rates for 1929 to 1984 is obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States
Mini-Historical Series HS-29 (U.S. Census Bureau 2003). Unemployment rates from 1913 to 1928
is obtained from Lebergott (1964) Table A-3. While there is overlap of certain years between the
two sources of unemployment data, we found that this speciﬁcation gave us the best match of the
mean and standard deviation reported in Whittington et al.
32Infant Mortality
Infant mortatiliy data from 1915 to 1984 is obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States Mini-Historical Series HS-13 (U.S. Census Bureau 2003). However, no data appears to be
available before 1915 and Whittington et al. do not record the source or give any indication of what
values they used for 1913 and 1914. Some studies cite an estimated infant mortality rate of 200
in the early 1700s and then use a linear extrapolation for years between 1700 and 1915. Because
the measured infant mortality rate for 1915 is 99.9, it is likely that Whittington et al. simply used
values of 100 for both 1913 and 1914. Doing so closely matches their reported mean and standard
deviation.
Immigration
The immigration series is listed as the immigration of the at-risk group as a fraction of the resident
at-risk group. We assume that the at-risk group is the age group 16-44.19 We use the original
source material as provided in the previous correspondence from Leslie Whittington. For 1913-
1970, immigration by age is obtained from the Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial
Times to 1970 Series C 138-142, and population totals by age come from Series A 29-42 of the
same volume (U.S. Census Bureau 1975). The source of the remaining data for 1971-1984 is listed
as various years of the Statistical Abstract; we use the Historical Statistics of the United States:
Millenium Edition Online (U.S. Census Bureau 2006).20
19Deﬁning the at-risk group as females aged 16-44 requires making an assumption that the percent of
immigrants that are female is uncorrelated with the percent of immigrants that are aged 16-44, and yields
a series that does not match the reported moments in Whittington et al. (1990).
20The ages for which data are available diﬀer slightly over the years. The number of immigrants prior to
1918 was reported for 14-44 year olds. From 1940-1944, the reported age category was 16-45, and from 1971
onwards, 15-44 year-olds were reported. We do not attempt any correction for these diﬀerences.
33Reconstructed 1913-1984 Data Series
Fertility Personal Male & Asset Unemploy- Infant Age 16-44 Female
Year Rate Exemption Income ment Mortality Immigration Wage
1913 124.7 0 4,090 0.043 100 0.02086 0.461
1914 126.6 0 3,887 0.079 100 0.02043 0.458
1915 125 0 3,860 0.085 99.9 0.00504 0.467
1916 123.4 0 4,294 0.051 101 0.00450 0.492
1917 121 19.27 4,388 0.046 93.8 0.00434 0.503
1918 119.8 23.94 4,920 0.014 100.9 0.00157 0.554
1919 111.2 20.07 4,536 0.014 86.6 0.00197 0.548
1920 117.9 15.33 3,990 0.052 85.8 0.00608 0.627
1921 119.8 34.32 3,529 0.117 75.6 0.01141 0.657
1922 111.2 36.65 3,782 0.067 76.2 0.00403 0.681
1923 110.5 25.83 4,271 0.024 77.1 0.00723 0.72
1924 110.9 27.34 4,136 0.05 70.8 0.00948 0.738
1925 106.6 22.85 4,167 0.032 71.7 0.00389 0.712
1926 102.6 21.13 4,268 0.018 73.3 0.00410 0.713
1927 99.8 24.61 4,237 0.033 64.6 0.00450 0.717
1928 93.8 31.96 4,390 0.042 68.7 0.00403 0.747
1929 89.2 27.29 4,751 0.032 67.6 0.00359 0.737
1930 89.2 18.4 4,570 0.087 64.6 0.00301 0.738
1931 84.6 14.91 4,386 0.159 61.6 0.00113 0.735
1932 81.7 28.36 4,070 0.236 57.6 0.00038 0.702
1933 76.3 31.95 4,059 0.249 58.1 0.00025 0.786
1934 78.5 33.91 4,164 0.217 60.1 0.00031 0.972
1935 77.2 36.98 4,304 0.201 55.7 0.00037 0.959
1936 75.8 50.12 4,716 0.169 57.1 0.00038 0.928
1937 77.1 42.79 4,727 0.143 54.4 0.00055 0.981
1938 79.1 32.22 4,437 0.19 51 0.00075 0.988
1939 77.6 36.53 4,857 0.172 48 0.00086 1
1940 79.9 53.33 5,179 0.146 47 0.00070 1.043
1941 83.4 102.49 5,936 0.099 45.3 0.00048 1.084
1942 91.5 137.7 6,678 0.047 40.4 0.00027 1.147
1943 94.3 141.2 7,327 0.019 40.4 0.00023 1.278
1944 88.4 243.83 7,561 0.012 39.8 0.00028 1.351
1945 85.9 238.4 7,304 0.019 38.3 0.00038 1.358
1946 101.9 193.16 6,983 0.039 33.8 0.00129 1.359
1947 113.3 168.9 6,604 0.039 32.2 0.00152 1.368
1948 107.3 149.79 6,811 0.038 32 0.00167 1.405
1949 107.1 147.05 7,076 0.059 31.3 0.00183 1.323
1950 106.2 163.1 7,442 0.053 29.2 0.00225 1.239
1951 111.5 178.14 7,622 0.033 28.4 0.00179 1.235
1952 113.9 189.43 7,691 0.03 28.4 0.00235 1.287
1953 115.2 186.51 7,797 0.029 27.8 0.00162 1.423
1954 118.1 165.46 7,910 0.055 26.6 0.00198 1.404
1955 118.5 170.57 8,603 0.044 26.4 0.00227 1.661
1956 121.2 171 8,404 0.041 26 0.00299 1.669
1957 122.9 165.12 8,458 0.043 26.3 0.00299 1.729
34Fertility Personal Male & Asset Unemploy- Infant Age 16-44 Female
Year Rate Exemption Income ment Mortality Immigration Wage
1958 120.2 158.66 8,470 0.068 27.1 0.00231 1.746
1959 118.8 162.19 8,989 0.055 26.4 0.00232 1.765
1960 118 158.28 9,043 0.055 26 0.00237 1.776
1961 117.2 160.71 9,298 0.067 25.3 0.00236 1.739
1962 112.2 161.58 9,563 0.055 25.3 0.00247 1.777
1963 108.5 161.61 9,802 0.057 25.2 0.00263 1.812
1964 105 142.73 10,125 0.052 24.8 0.00244 1.855
1965 96.6 134.6 10,481 0.045 24.7 0.00243 1.903
1966 91.3 133.94 11,178 0.038 23.7 0.00240 1.859
1967 87.6 133.8 11,032 0.038 22.4 0.00258 1.918
1968 85.7 145.1 11,221 0.036 21.8 0.00321 1.979
1969 86.5 142.62 11,290 0.035 20.9 0.00253 2.063
1970 87.9 130.58 11,183 0.049 20 0.00261 2.064
1971 81.8 132.99 11,284 0.059 19.1 0.00262 2.057
1972 73.4 144.85 11,882 0.056 18.5 0.00268 2.094
1973 69.2 140.87 12,231 0.049 17.7 0.00269 2.061
1974 68.4 130.49 11,429 0.056 16.7 0.00259 2.034
1975 66 122.36 11,154 0.085 16.1 0.00245 2.103
1976 65.8 120.08 11,434 0.077 15.2 0.00247 2.17
1977 66.8 116.11 11,930 0.071 14.1 0.00277 2.187
1978 65.5 118.98 11,972 0.061 13.8 0.00363 2.277
1979 67.2 132.93 11,646 0.058 13.1 0.00274 2.206
1980 68.4 123.17 10,857 0.071 12.6 0.00310 2.136
1981 67.4 119.31 10,765 0.076 11.9 0.00342 2.106
1982 67.3 102.04 10,255 0.097 11.5 0.00339 2.173
1983 65.8 92.49 10,595 0.096 11.2 0.00324 2.216
1984 65.4 83.9 11,370 0.075 10.8 0.00309 2.24
B Extending the Data
General Fertility Rate
For our extended data series, we use the general fertility rate in years 1913-1959 from the Datapedia
of the United States (Kurian 2001) and years 1960-2005 from the National Vital Statistics Report
(Martin, Hamilton, Sutton, Ventura, Menacker and Munson 2005). The general fertility rates
reported in the Datapedia match those reported in Whittington et al. in all but two years; however,
the National Vital Statistics Report’s general fertility rates diﬀer slightly in several years. Since we
believe the National Vital Statistics Report to have the most current and reliable fertility data, we
use these data for all years they are available.
35Child Tax Beneﬁts
The value of the personal exemption for a parent claiming a child as a dependent is calculated by
multiplying the statutory amount of the personal exemption by the marginal tax rate.21 From 1913
to 1916, there was no personal exemption for dependents. Starting in 1917, a personal exemption
for dependents was introduced and set at $200, one ﬁfth of the personal exemption for a individual.
In 1944, the separate category for dependents was removed; the personal exemption for a dependent
was equal to the personal exemption for the taxpayer or a spouse.
Because the value of the personal exemption depends on the marginal tax rate, an average
marginal tax rate for each year is needed. Whittington et al. use an arithmetic average marginal
statutory income tax rate weighted by adjusted gross income that was ﬁrst introduced by Barrow
and Sahasakul (1983) and then updated to include all years from 1916 to 198322 in (Barrow and
Sahasakul 1986). Stephenson (1998) updated the series to 1994.23 We use the Barrow and Sahasakul
methodology to extend the average marginal tax rate series to 2005 using data from the IRS
Statistics of Income (see http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04in01tr.xls). The IRS tables report the
number of taxpayers and the amount of income at each marginal tax rate. Using this data, we
take the arithmetic average weighted by AGI to update the Barrow-Sahasakul statutory marginal
tax rate series. Some of the AGI cells in the IRS data are negative and are dropped from the
calculation.
The value of the personal exemption is not the only tax beneﬁt for a parent claiming a child
as a dependent. To calculate the total beneﬁt, we add the tax value of the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), Child and Dependent Care Credit (CDCC), and the Child Tax Credit (CTC) to
the value of the personal exemption. Unlike the additional personal exemption that can be claimed
by nearly every taxpayer with a dependent child, the EITC can only be claimed by taxpayers in
21The personal exemption level series is commonly available. We used the series provided by the tax policy
center, online at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org.
22As noted by Whittinton et al. Barrow and Sahasakul calculate the average marginal tax rate starting
in 1916 because this is when the IRS statistics of income data become available. However, since from 1913
to 1916 the personal exemption for dependents was zero, no values for the value of the personal exemption
series are missing.
23Stephenson notes that the average marginal tax rates reported by Barrow and Sahasakul (1986) for 1981
and 1983 are slightly diﬀerent than the values that he calculates. Stephenson attributes the diﬀerence to
Barrow and Sahasakul’s use of preliminary statistics of income data.
36a speciﬁc income range and the CDCC can only be claimed by taxpayers where there is no stay-
at-home parent. Thus, rather than calculate the tax value of these beneﬁts for a taxpayer in the
particular situation, we take the real value of all beneﬁts from these three tax provisions and divide
by the number of children to produce an average beneﬁt level. The value of the personal exemption
and the total value of beneﬁts are the same until the mid 1970’s when these tax provisions are
introduced. The tax expenditure on the EITC, CDCC, and CTC were gathered from the OMB
Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government Tables 5-1 and 19-1 from various
years.
Male and Asset Income
Male and asset income data were constructed from a variety of sources. From 1947-2005, male
income data were obtained from the Historical Income Table P-53 constructed by the U.S. Census
Bureau.24 Male income data before 1947 were constructed by estimating the equation
MaleIncomet = α0 + β0MedianIncomet + ǫt (A-1)
for years 1947-2005, and using these estimated coeﬃcients to impute male income from median
income prior to 194725. The series that Whittington et al. used includes asset income, which was
obtained from two additional sources: the Statistics of Income for years 1916-1936, and the National
Income and Product Accounts for years 1929-2005. Finally, the series was adjusted to 2005 dollars.
Other Series
As in the unemployment series for replication, unemployment data after 1929 is obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The infant mortality series is also extended to 2005 using the same
source as the replication data, the U.S. Census Bureau.
For years 1986 - 2005, the Department of Homeland Security publishes the number of immigrants
24see http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/incpertoc.html.
25Median income from 1913-1960 is from Lebergott (1964). Using the overlapping years 1947-1960, a
scaling factor was estimated and applied to the imputed male income series to make the transition between
the two series smooth
37by age and gender in the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. These reports are available on the
Department of Homeland Security’s website.26 These data were appended to the immigration data
used for replication.
While the constructed female wage series was used for replication purposes, for our later analysis,
we obtain female wages for 1973-2005 from the Economic Policy Institute and estimate a scaling
factor which is applied to Whittington et al.’s series to ﬁll in the values from 1913-1972.
Complete 1913-2005 Data
Fertility Child Tax Male Unemploy- Infant Age 16-44 Female
Year Rate Beneﬁts Income ment Mortality Immigration Wage
1913 124.7 0.00 18,309.34 0.043 100 0.01455 2.159
1914 126.6 0.00 17,886.99 0.079 100 0.01505 2.145
1915 125 0.00 17,737.60 0.085 99.9 0.00459 2.187
1916 123.4 0.00 18,786.45 0.051 101 0.00374 2.304
1917 121 112.91 18,559.87 0.046 93.8 0.00376 2.356
1918 119.8 139.68 18,632.94 0.014 100.9 0.00142 2.594
1919 111.2 117.41 18,160.82 0.014 86.6 0.00169 2.562
1920 117.9 89.84 17,704.93 0.052 85.8 0.00543 2.936
1921 119.8 183.30 17,451.41 0.117 75.6 0.01062 3.077
1922 111.2 213.90 18,617.67 0.067 76.2 0.00436 3.189
1923 110.5 150.76 20,249.26 0.024 77.1 0.00626 3.372
1924 110.9 159.89 20,218.60 0.05 70.8 0.00800 3.456
1925 106.6 133.92 19,634.65 0.032 71.7 0.00364 3.334
1926 102.6 123.58 20,122.23 0.018 73.3 0.00379 3.339
1927 99.8 143.67 20,401.31 0.033 64.6 0.00398 3.358
1928 93.8 187.31 20,484.62 0.042 68.7 0.00388 3.498
1929 89.3 159.89 20,699.47 0.032 67.6 0.00369 3.451
1930 89.2 107.59 19,807.67 0.087 64.6 0.00324 3.456
1931 84.6 87.37 18,999.14 0.159 61.6 0.00137 3.442
1932 81.7 165.36 17,625.68 0.236 57.6 0.00049 3.287
1933 76.3 186.29 17,043.05 0.249 58.1 0.00031 3.681
1934 78.5 198.21 17,536.04 0.217 60.1 0.00038 4.552
1935 77.2 216.68 17,682.97 0.201 55.7 0.00046 4.491
1936 75.8 292.25 18,606.59 0.169 57.1 0.00047 4.346
1937 77.1 249.55 19,093.16 0.143 54.4 0.00064 4.594
1938 79.1 188.37 17,941.25 0.19 51 0.00087 4.627
1939 77.6 213.57 18,711.81 0.172 48 0.00093 4.683
1940 79.9 312.48 19,190.55 0.146 47 0.00077 4.884
1941 83.4 600.51 20,055.10 0.099 45.3 0.00054 5.076
1942 91.5 805.16 20,946.84 0.047 40.4 0.00032 5.371
1943 94.3 825.79 22,196.92 0.019 40.4 0.00028 5.985
26see http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm.
38Fertility Child Tax Male Unemploy- Infant Age 16-44 Female
Year Rate Beneﬁts Income ment Mortality Immigration Wage
1944 88.8 1,398.17 22,995.08 0.012 39.8 0.00035 6.327
1945 85.9 1,394.23 23,045.00 0.019 38.3 0.00051 6.359
1946 101.9 1,131.74 22,541.69 0.039 33.8 0.00199 6.364
1947 113.3 989.64 20,363.85 0.039 32.2 0.00198 6.406
1948 107.3 875.20 19,809.01 0.038 32 0.00207 6.58
1949 107.1 861.62 20,323.56 0.059 31.3 0.00214 6.196
1950 106.2 953.00 21,795.75 0.053 29.2 0.00239 5.802
1951 111.5 1,041.10 22,819.57 0.033 28.4 0.00189 5.783
1952 113.9 1,109.89 23,177.59 0.03 28.4 0.00255 6.027
1953 115.2 1,092.80 24,385.18 0.029 27.8 0.00189 6.664
1954 118.1 967.06 24,359.67 0.055 26.6 0.00219 6.575
1955 118.5 996.90 25,817.02 0.044 26.4 0.00245 7.778
1956 121.2 999.48 27,291.53 0.041 26 0.00315 7.816
1957 122.9 967.46 27,266.51 0.043 26.3 0.00321 8.097
1958 120.2 928.52 26,854.98 0.068 27.1 0.00271 8.176
1959 118.8 950.33 28,446.68 0.055 26.4 0.00269 8.265
1960 118 926.36 28,753.13 0.055 26 0.00274 8.317
1961 117.1 940.58 29,653.57 0.067 25.3 0.00269 8.144
1962 112 946.75 30,843.61 0.055 25.3 0.00277 8.322
1963 108.3 945.86 31,734.30 0.057 25.2 0.00298 8.485
1964 104.7 835.38 32,786.44 0.052 24.8 0.00289 8.687
1965 96.3 788.64 33,657.01 0.045 24.7 0.00289 8.912
1966 90.8 784.82 35,673.43 0.038 23.7 0.00281 8.706
1967 87.2 782.37 36,400.13 0.038 22.4 0.00303 8.982
1968 85.2 848.54 37,302.76 0.036 21.8 0.00375 9.268
1969 86.1 833.35 38,471.56 0.035 20.9 0.00284 9.661
1970 87.9 764.46 38,369.11 0.049 20 0.00286 9.666
1971 81.6 777.95 38,162.67 0.059 19.1 0.00284 9.633
1972 73.1 848.01 39,802.10 0.056 18.5 0.00291 9.806
1973 68.8 824.75 40,713.68 0.049 17.7 0.00291 9.951
1974 67.8 776.97 44,256.83 0.056 16.7 0.00280 9.73
1975 66 757.65 43,358.02 0.085 16.1 0.00264 9.773
1976 65 806.34 43,829.38 0.077 15.2 0.00269 9.869
1977 66.8 796.56 40,102.89 0.071 14.1 0.00297 9.856
1978 65.5 808.47 42,210.55 0.061 13.8 0.00384 10.103
1979 67.2 852.46 41,978.00 0.058 13.1 0.00290 10.346
1980 68.4 827.71 41,766.75 0.071 12.6 0.00329 10.322
1981 67.3 813.83 42,185.98 0.076 11.9 0.00363 10.248
1982 67.3 690.79 41,977.79 0.097 11.5 0.00356 10.275
1983 65.7 638.60 42,543.73 0.096 11.2 0.00331 10.414
1984 65.5 611.46 44,132.05 0.075 10.8 0.00318 10.514
1985 66.3 636.05 44,941.38 0.072 10.6 0.00329 10.573
1986 65.4 686.11 46,223.44 0.07 10.4 0.00334 10.844
1987 65.8 971.47 46,272.96 0.062 10.1 0.00336 11.126
1988 67.3 936.77 46,748.23 0.055 10 0.00354 11.229
1989 69.2 962.84 47,289.59 0.053 9.8 0.00646 11.22
1990 70.9 955.05 46,044.02 0.056 9.2 0.00891 11.251
1991 69.3 973.56 44,831.14 0.068 8.9 0.00760 11.299
39Fertility Child Tax Male Unemploy- Infant Age 16-44 Female
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1992 68.4 1,017.63 43,371.91 0.075 8.5 0.00530 11.389
1993 67 1,219.79 42,906.69 0.069 8.4 0.00518 11.514
1994 65.9 1,252.32 44,043.06 0.061 8 0.00453 11.42
1995 64.6 1,227.08 45,117.02 0.056 7.6 0.00397 11.347
1996 64.1 1,286.12 45,635.49 0.054 7.3 0.00517 11.394
1997 63.6 1,356.05 46,908.29 0.049 7.2 0.00449 11.682
1998 64.3 1,450.81 49,689.69 0.045 7.2 0.00364 11.969
1999 64.4 1,711.55 49,516.12 0.042 7.1 0.00357 12.076
2000 65.9 1,687.82 50,168.74 0.04 6.9 0.00505 12.325
2001 65.3 1,655.20 48,822.69 0.047 6.8 0.00653 12.589
2002 64.8 1,732.16 47,774.14 0.058 7 0.00631 12.906
2003 66.1 1,953.81 46,914.04 0.06 6.9 0.00406 12.929
2004 66.3 1,752.48 47,459.20 0.055 6.8 0.00568 12.912
2005 66.7 2,087.97 47,932.25 0.061 6.7 0.00663 12.816
40